Aircraft maintenance activities are rife with opportunities for error. The concurrent in-flight failure of all of the engines of a non-scheduled airline flight and the following list of human lives highlight one of these opportunities. As commonly recognized among flight operators, each flight safety agency follows the criteria of the International Civil Aviation Organization Annex 16 in which all the evidences of the technical investigation pave the way for avoiding future flight accidents or incidents. On the other hand, when the Italian penal procedure code was applied for the Tuninter aircraft ATR 72 (identification code TS-LBB) crash at issue on 6 August 2005 near Palermo (Italy), the investigation is also carried out for finding (if concurrent or not) the personal and professional responsibilities. This was the task of the first author (R.M.A.M.). Now, this article briefly reports the findings of the investigation and discusses more in detail how both human factors of design and human factors in the published instructions for the completion of a maintenance task contributed to this accident.
In total, 15 passengers and 1 cabin attendant crewmember suffered fatal injuries. The remaining occupants sustained a variety of injuries from slight to serious. After the crash, in conformance with the requirements of articles 449, 428 and 589 of the Italian penal code, paragraphs I and III, the Italian Ministry of Justice set up an inquiry into the causes of the disaster. The authors, in different roles, were given the task of determining the probable cause of accident. The first author (R.M.A.M.) was the official investigator of the Italian Department of Justice. Then, all the information, the reports and the factual evidences given by R.M.A.M. are not independent opinions, but he was the only one admitted to the non-publicly disclosed files and documents of the Italian Department of Justice. From the available data of flight data recorder (FDR), cockpit voice recorder (CVR), flight documentation and subsequent physical examination of the aircraft, the authors found that the aircraft had depleted all of the fuel aboard leading to the concurrent flame out of both engines. This evidence was in opposition with the dramatic pilot communication with Palermo air traffic control (ATC) during the emergency, as recorded by CVR, where the crew declared the presence of 1800 kg of fuel on board. The performance and maintenance records of the aircraft revealed that a replacement of the fuel quantity indicator (FQI) was carried out shortly before the accident flight. Furthermore, the records revealed that the newly installed FQI was appropriate for installation in the ATR 42 family of aircraft and not the ATR 72 family of aircraft. The different algorithms used by the different FQIs of the ATR 72 and ATR 42 coupled with different fuel probes architecture and capacitance (for those families of aircraft) lead to the conclusion that a potential hazard is hidden in this type of maintenance, particularly in the light that in some configurations of ATR 72, the fuel low-level signal does not have an independent sensor and circuit. This article discusses the replacement of the FQI, provides an analysis of the effects of this replacement, reviews alternative installations and ends by making recommendations to mitigate risks in this situation.
During the investigation, the Agenzia Nazionale Sicurezza Volo (ANSV) 
Factual evidence
The accident aircraft was built by ATR in March 1992 and delivered to the operator, Tuninter, on 22 April 1992. Prior to the accident, the aircraft had accumulated 29,893.5 h of flight and 35,259 cycles. It had completed its last periodic airworthiness inspection in March 2004. The particulars of the aircraft are presented in Table 1 . There was no evidence of pre-impact structural failure. Because the two Pratt and Whitney 124B turboprop engines suffered a propulsive failure, R.M.A.M. closely followed the investigation through the complete disassembly and teardown of both engines at the Lufthansa Technik AERO GmbH facility in Alzey near Frankfurt, Germany.
Although the engines had minor discrepancies, both of the engines were free from defects. In Table 2 , summary information regarding the powerplants is shown.
Finding no significant discrepancies with the powerplants, the investigation turned to the fuel supply. The last thorough inspection of the aircraft fuel tanks was conducted on 12 and 13 March 2004 at the ATR facility in Toulouse, France. Video inspection of the fuel tank devices and structure, as required by ATR documents SWAR no. DS/CA-373/04 and ATR no. DO/IS-637/04 (FH 27318 e CY 31986), was accomplished. In these inspections, minor discrepancies were noted. The Italian Air Force 3 laboratory conducted a fuel chemical and physical properties test of the residual fuel found in the fuel filters. No defects were reported.
The investigation turned to the aircraft flight performance and maintenance records. On 5 August 2005, the same crew that operated the accident flight made the following flights (ATR 72 TS-LBB maintenance logbook no. 068297, Figure 1 , and ATR 72 TS-LBB performance record book no. 075635, Figure 2 ). states that the crew reported that they had 2300 kg aboard the aircraft on arrival in Bari. To this, they added 600 L (Figure 3 ) of fuel prior departure from Tunis. The report further states that the crew now had an indicated fuel load of 2700 kg. 2 There is no mention whether the crew conducted a fuel upload verification that volume reported by the fuel vendor was equal to the change in fuel weight displayed on the fuel gauge.
Using the common conversion of 1 L of turbine fuel weighing 0.8 kg, the 600 L added to the aircraft should have raised the FQI indication by 480 kg vice the 400 kg reported. This difference, equal to 20% of the weight added to the aircraft, could have been an early indication of something amiss with the FQI system. The load and trim sheet for the flight from Tunis to Bari (Figure 4 ), the flight immediately preceding the accident flight, shows 3770 kg of fuel aboard for the flight to Bari. Based upon the report of the ANSV, the aircraft had 2300 kg aboard upon arrival. There is no indication whether the crew conducted a ''reasonableness'' test of the 1470 kg fuel burn from Tunis to Bari, a flight of approximately 400 nm. Furthermore, there is no indication whether there was any notice of the fact that if the aircraft just consumed 1470 kg on a flight of approximately 400 nm and it would be reasonable to assume that it would use 50% more fuel for the 600 nm flight to Djerba or approximately 2200 kg, slightly less than the indicated total fuel aboard the aircraft for the flight to Djerba. 
FQI modular design
The ATR 42 and ATR 72 aircraft utilize a similar cockpit panel. The FQI is located in the lower left quadrant of the center panel ( Figure 5 The FQIs incorporate low-level lights which activate a visual and an aural alert when the fuel remaining is equal to a specified amount. In first-generation devices, the low-level alerts are activated by the same system that calculates and displays the fuel quantity and is not independent from the computed quantity of fuel reading on the LED-windows of the FQI. Later, to meet the extended twin-engine operations (ETOPS) requirements, the manufacturer of the FQI, Intertechnique, developed a later generation of FQIs in which the lowlevel signals have an independent circuit. The decision to install this type of FQIs is made by the aircraft operator. [4] [5] [6] [7] Close inspection of the FQIs appropriate to the ATR 42 and the ATR 72 shows a similarity among their basic external architectures and the circuital hardware ( Figure 6 (a)-(c)).
The typeset of the external labeling and the similar part numbers seems to be identical ( Figure 6 (a)-(c); Tables 3 and 4) .
Differences between the FQI for the ATR 42 and the ATR 72 can be found in the stampings on the faceplates of the FQIs in which the allowable fuel is indicated (Figure 6(a)-(c) ) and on the cartridge labels in which the silkscreen of P/N and S/N are shown. The FQIs of the ATR 42 and the ATR 72 allow a universal modularity for each type of cockpit; moreover, the rear plunging connectors (S/N 1004 53T-2B P, NAS 1599 TYPE 14-19 SW; S/N 1004 53T-3B P) are interchangeable. This is true for both the first and the second generation of FQI. Anyway, the FQIs of the ATR 42 and the ATR 72 show exterior and interior differences being the former the part/number (P/N) and serial/number (S/N) on the cartridge identification label and the hardware circuital components the latter (the values of resistances R20, R21, R41 for the chain of diodes MA1, MA2, MA4, MA5 as electronic components of FQI block diagram (Figure 6(b) )). These differences are relative to non-ETOPS (extended-range twin-engine operational performance standard) FQIs like those of the aircrafts under examination. The circuital differences are linked to the different input signals (and different electronic processing) arising from the tank probes having different capacitances for ATR 72 and ATR 42.
FQI removal, installation and testing
The procedure for the removal and installation of the FQI and the procedure for the testing of the FQI are specified in manufacturer's documents designated Job Instruction Cards (JIC). 6 The procedure for the removal and installation of the FQI requires, as a final step, the test of the FQI and states ''. SEE JOB INSTRUCTION CARD JIC: 284200-TST-10000. JIC: 284200-TST-10000 is the procedure for the test of the FQI .'' This procedure tests the indicator through a series of ''self-test'' processes. After the conclusion of the ''self-test'' procedures, the JIC references that the FQI should display the fuel remaining in the respective tanks without any reference to an independent verification of the amount of fuel in the tanks.
Fuel quantity probe system
The design principle of the fuel tank fuel probe system is one based on the capacitance variations associated with the fuel level. The main difference between the Green shading indicates the FQI P/N in common for ATR 72. 
Green shading indicates the FQI P/N in common for ATR 42. probe-set of the two types of aircraft is in the number of probes in the fuel tanks, five in each wing fuel tank of the ATR 42 and six in each wing fuel tank of the ATR 72.
As noted in Figures 7 and 8 , the capacitance at the ''empty'' or minimum point varies significantly between the aircraft types (here only the first probes for both aircrafts are shown). Furthermore, as noted previously, there is an additional probe in the ATR 72. Following the line and components chain of Figure 9 , one can note the signals from the probes to the FQI. This circuital architecture undergoes slight differences when the independent low-level ''warning-lights'' signal has to be provided for ETOPS configuration of aircraft (see Figure 10) .
When evaluating the empty tank capacitance of the FQI system circuits of the ATR 42 vice the ATR 72, there are noticeable differences whether ETOPS or non-ETOPS (Figures 9 and 10) . As previously mentioned, these figures sketch the circuital design for non-ETOPS and ETOPS FQIs architectures. In non-ETOPS FQI (both for ATR 42 and ATR 72), the low-level electrical signal is running in serial bus with the output tank probes capacitance signals (dependent low-level scheme). In the ETOPS FQI, different data bus is processed in parallel and it is not directly dependent on the output tank probe signals. Anyway, this article deals with the FQIs of ATR 42 and ATR 72 of the first type only. When the system capacitance for the FQI system of the ATR 42 and the ATR 72 is summed at the FQI, there are significant differences as noted in Figure 11 . The data in Figure 11 make a compelling argument for directly evaluating the effect of ATR 72 FQI probe-set capacitance when mated with an ATR 42 FQI.
FQI incorrect replacement test-bench simulation
To simulate the behavior of an FQI appropriate to an ATR 42 when incorrectly installed into the cockpit of an ATR 72, the following tests were performed in a devoted test-bench (Figure 12 To understand the relationship between the fuel probe-sets and the FQI displays on the LED-windows in the FQI or, in other words, the correlation between the probe-set capacitance and the displayed fuel quantity, three procedural steps were performed:
Step 1: all of the electric circuits of the FQIs were analyzed (i.e. processing circuits of probelevel signals) and their relative differentiations in terms of external markings and of electrical components.
Step 2: once the components were identified and put in order in accordance with the manufacturer's circuit scheme between the fuel probe-set and FQI, the test-bench was able to give-in the range of probe capacitance variations connected with variable fuel presence in the tanks-the input/output logic between the dielectric capacitance and the real level of fuel, that is where Y is the indicated fuel quantity in the tank (kg) and X is the total amount of fuel probe-set capacitance. The previous equations have been provided for the referred equipment by Intertechnique, the manufacturer of the FQI, as all the relationships that will be used in this section. Equations (1) and (2) were obtained by the accomplishment of ATP (CR10936 and CR10662)-previously adopted-to both the FQIs (S/N 749-158 (ATR 42) and S/N 748-681-2 (ATR 72)) on the test-bench of Figure 12 . These procedures are in compliance with the joint aviation authority (JAA) quality directivities for instrument evaluation (PGQ-1556). In two phases, both of the FQIs were connected to the test-bench equipment. The units were subjected to the calibration tests through a continuous variation of the input capacitance from the fuel probe-set simulators. Roughly speaking, the test-bench is used to process the basic derivation for flux linkages in tubular conductors for finding the flux linkages for both core and sheath of the tank probes according to the formulas
where l T , l i and l E are the total flux linkage associated with conductor, the flux linkage internal to conductor and the flux linkage external to conductor, respectively. Basically, the above-mentioned parameters are linked to the conductor geometrical features (in polar coordinates frames, we say r, a, b) and they depend on the conductor permeability, m, and the current value, i, that is
where m out is the permeability of the material external to the conductor. All of the main FQI functions were checked with particular reference to the indicated fuel presence in the tank and its low-level detection (lights ''ON'').
Step 3: once the prescribed ATP parameters were accomplished, the simulation of an incorrect replacement (simulation of the installation of a FQI appropriate to an ATR 42 into an ATR 72) was conducted in the test-bench through testing the FQI 749158 of ATR 42 (instead of FQI 748681-2 for ATR 72). At this point, the input signal for this FQI (FQI 749158 of ATR 42) was the total capacitance arising from the fuel probe-set of the ATR 72. From the given partial capacitances, one obtains the total capacitance to be equal to 144.7 pF (real/ virtual zero quantity of fuel on board). When this value of capacitance (for ATR 72) was processed by the test-bench into the FQI (ATR 42), the FQI indicated a fuel quantity of 910 and 890 kg (910 and 890 kg of fictitious fuel in the left and right tanks, respectively). Following the same procedure, the range of capacitance values (from empty to full tank configurations) the ''mismatching FQI'' law was obtained and is shown in Figure 13 .
These tests were conducted three times with no variation in data.
Fuel low-level alerting consideration
The design of the ATR 42 and the ATR 72 are in conformance with international regulation. Neither US 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 25 (14CFR25) or European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Certification Specification 25-Large Aeroplanes (superseding JAR-25) require the installation of fuel low-level alerting systems independent from the fuel quantity measuring system. In some cases, manufacturers, ATR included, have developed fuel low-level alerting systems independent from the fuel quantity measuring systems. In the case of TU1153, the ANSV 2 determined that . had there been the alternate independent fuel low level alerting system approved by ATR for installation in the ATR 72 installed in the accident aircraft, twice during the day of the accident the system would have alerted the crew to a low fuel situation .
The flight crew was not alerted to the low fuel condition and missed an important opportunity to prevent the accident.
Human factor considerations
The ATR 42/72 family of aircraft is designed with a high degree of commonality. ATR describes the ATR 42/72 aircraft family as having an ''interchangeability of parts and mechanisms.'' 7 In the case of ATR 42 FQI part number 749-158, the unit was physically interchangeable with ATR 72 FQI part number 748681-2. Because the units were interchangeable, the maintenance technicians of the operator were able to install the incorrect unit. The shape and interchangeability of line replaceable units (LRUs) is an on-going concern in the human factors of maintenance community:
. The complexity of maintenance error can range from errors as simple as a maintenance technician forgetting to torque a finger-tightened screw to some deficiency in the design of the aircraft or the management of the maintenance process. The maintenance community has become adept at dealing with these errors through redesign and process change. For example, units such as gauges, communication and navigation units, etc., which do not require taking the aircraft to the maintenance hangar for replacement (line replaceable units), are currently being designed with different size or shape electrical and fluid connectors so that cross-connection errors upon reassembly are eliminated .
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This is not the case with the ATR FQI. The modular design of the ATR 72 FQI, with minor distinguishing features, contributes little to reduce the possibility of incorrect installation once the incorrect unit has been selected.
Reason 13 has developed what he calls the ''Generic Error-Modelling System (GEMS).'' The scheme of Table 5 summarizes a portion of Reason's GEMS. He describes errors as being skill-based, rule-based or knowledge-based. According to Reason, skill-based errors are those errors that occur during familiar, routine actions, using pre-existing mental models that may be automatically performed once initiated and usually having predictable errors caused by technician actions. An example could be damage to a fastener made by a technician who selected and used the incorrect size of wrench. Rule-based errors are those errors that occur during less familiar tasks involving problem solving activities, using pre-existing rules (or procedures), and usually have predictable errors often associated with a failure to follow the rules or the omission of a step in a procedure. An example could be the failure of a technician to verify the applicability of a part. Knowledgebased errors are those errors that occur during unfamiliar problem solving activities where the technician is engaged in a conscious process to solve the problem and where error types vary. The maintenance technicians of the operator were conducting a reasonably familiar problem solving task (removal and replacement of a cockpit indicator). According to Reason, 13, 14 this type of task predictably has rule-based errors where familiarity with the task dominates the chance of error and the ease of error detection may be difficult. The ATR FQI units are of a similar color and coding. Manufacturers and operators need to consider the interaction of the users in the design of devices, systems . A person's most basic physical and sensory capabilities include vision, hearing, manual dexterity and reach. A number of related design factors can interact with them to influence human performance: the legibility and discriminability of displayed symbols, audibility and distinctiveness of alarms, the strength required to make connections and the requirements for reaching controls . (emphasis by the authors). 15 To reduce the opportunity for incorrect installation and/or the making of incorrect connections in medical devices, the US Food and Drug Administration recommends that ''. If a hazard cannot be eliminated by design solution, color codes or other markings will help the user achieve proper connections and component or accessory installation .'' 15 This is sound advice for the designers of both medical devices and aircraft components. Aviation maintenance human factors experts recommend that error reduction strategies (those strategies incorporated into the maintenance system to prevent error at the point of work such as improved lighting, improved component marking and access, and better training) be complemented by error capturing (those strategies incorporated into the maintenance system to trap errors before errors can make it into the air transportation system such as between task inspections, post task inspections, independent verification tasks and functional tests). The JIC for the replacement of the FQI did not clearly state the need for an independent verification of the fuel aboard the aircraft as part of the FQI functional verification following replacement, an important error trapping strategy.
It is apparent from the preceding discussion that aviation is an elaborate system involving the complex interaction of human and machines. ''. Since people design, build, operate, maintain and manage potentially hazardous technologies, it is hardly surprising that their decisions and actions contribute, one way or another, to virtually all unwanted events .'' 16 ''. Human and organizational factors now dominate the risks to aviation, and have done so for at least two decades .'' 17 ''. Safety Management Systems provide a formal, organized process whereby people plan, perform, assess, and improve the safe conduct of work .''
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Safety Management Systems (SMS) facilitate the orderly development and management of safe practices across the organization. In general, SMS use four cornerstones as a foundation: philosophy, policy, procedure and practice. That is, the organization must have made a philosophical decision that risk exists and that the organization acknowledges its responsibility to manage that risk, that the organization will include safety favorable structures and safety goals in all of its policies, that the organization wants people to use those procedures that encourage safety and that the on-the-job practices of the organization match with the stated focus on safe operations. The comprehensive management of safety includes an organization-wide focus on the concept that safety is good for the organization and that safety is everyone's responsibility.
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